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9
THE SOFT POWER DILEMMA: CAN THE EUROPEAN
UNION SACRIFICE THE CARROT AND THE STICK
AND COMMAND WITH SOFT POWER ALONE?
Helen Pollock

The end of th e 20th and the beginning of the 2 1st ce nt ur ies are o ften described as
a "unipolar mom ent , "I a tim e when th e United States sup ervi sed the ent ire w orld . It has
bankrolled wars, exe rcised its power in internation al instituti ons, and acted as a glo bal
wa tchdog to keep the o the r nations in lin e. But th e U nited States' method s are fallin g o ut
of favor in the int ernation al com m unity , and th e Europe an Union nIay have th e pot enti al
to shar e SOm e of th e United States' responsibilities. What wa s o nce a loose coalitio n of only
six stat es is now an o rganizatio n representing tw enty- seven nati on s, with a currenc y rivaling
and even ov erpowering th e dollar, and the sing le largest econo mic mark er in th e wo rld .?
However, the E U does not have the capac ity to use hard po wer as effectively as a nation
like th e United Stares, This paper will exam ine th e EU's use of soft power to influence inreruation al o utco mes, and evaluate wh eth er the E U can afford to rely not o n hard military
o r econ omic po wer, but o n its soft po wer capabilities.
EU's MILITARY HARD POWER
As <I n ac to r in internatio nal p oliti cs, th e EU has th e opti on of using tw o meth od s to in fluen ce o the r nation s and poli cy outcom es: w ielding hard power or soft po wer. H ard po wer
is <In actor's abilit y to influen ce the de cisions of an oth er global ent ity throu gh "indu cements
(carro ts) o r threat s (sticks)," and it is used most frequ ently in th e form of military po wer and
econo mic po wer .:' The EU has th e potential to use both , but in practi ce, it rarely puts either
to use. First , for a co m plete understanding of th e EU 's military hard power, two issues must
be addressed: the military capabilities of th e EU 's m ember states and th e capabilities of the
EU as <I w ho le. As separate nati ons , th e m ember states of th e EU hav e 1.6 milli on troops
and spend E' 160 billion o n defense (statistics second o nly to th e United States) and two of
the m ember states are nucl ear po w ers." Although th e US and th e EU have roughl y th e same
number of men and women under arms, the EU states spend only 40 per cent o f what the
U S spe nds o n th eir military, and allo cates mu ch less of it to research and devel opm ent or
airlift capabilities." In fact , these statistic s do not reflect actual depl o ym ent capability ; man y
of the m ember states' troops are not well trained for battle, sinc e they perform m ostly nonLIMITATIONS ON THE
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co m bat casks, and so me of rhein are co nsc ripted so ldiers . In addi tion , th ese tr o op s ca nnot be
co m mi tte d quickl y to a conflict, becau se bureau cr atic react io n tim e is relat ively slo w , and
m an y o f these for ces are also currentl y dedicated to N AT O operation s."
It is important to di stinguish be twee n the tr o op s of these indi vidu al states and E U
forces, becau se o nly E U fo rces can be deplo yed b y th e o rganizatio n. The capab ilities of th e
E U as a whol e have been growing since 199 9, b ut to da te, th e " rea lity of E U depl o ym ent
re mains co nfined to hum an itarian and resc ue tasks, peacek eeping tasks, and tasks fo r co m bat
forces in crisis m an agem ent ." ? The curre nt effo rt fo r a Europe an "army" tak es the f0 11n of
E U " ba ttlegro ups." The 1,500-man EU battlegroups can b e deployed wi th in 5 to 10 days
of receiv ing order s and tailored to specific o peratio ns." Des pite the commitm ent of 100. 000
tro op s, 400 air craft , and 100 naval vessels to the p roj ect , it d oes n ot constitu te a stand ing
army . These fo rces arc earma rk ed o nly, and can no t be de ploye d instantan eo usly. Provi sions
of th e plan also give m ember states the right to refu se to de ploy th eir sha re of th e forces ,"
which co uld ham strin g any operati on.
As it stands, th e EU has no o fficial a11n y to use as military hard p o w er - whether as a
"st ick" to deter acti on o r as the m eans to go to war. With out an army o r a m eans of depl o ying tro ops, th e EU h as no h ope of app lying military h ard power. Thi s is largely the res ult
of tw o limits o n E U milita ry power: th e ex te n t of integratio n and th e re liance on th e U S
for sec u rity .
The first and m ost important lim it o n milita ry hard power th rou gh a E urop ean a11ny is
Eu rop ean integrati o n . By encompassing 27 states, alo ng with their lan gu ages, incompatibl e
domestic legal struc tures, and nati on al identities and biases," the EU h as di scovered th at it
is nea rly impossible to unite all of the me m b er sta tes u nde r a common for eign poli cy. Th e
tl ilures of int egr ation we re o bv io us in Koso vo durin g its bid for ind ep en den ce in 200!); th e
E U m ad e a blan ket state me nt in su ppo rt of Ko so vo , bur Spai n - having a Basqu e pop ulatio n of its own clamoring for sovere ignty - refu sed to j o in th e co n u no n poli cy.11 The EU
grap ple s with conflictin g political agen das and ev en multiple states w ith m ilitary neutralit y,
as we ll as a hi story of co n flict and figh ting between th em . In the gu arded political clim ate
after Wo rld W ar II , th e European nati o ns rebuilt and becam e fier cely protective of th ei r
sovere ignty. In add itio n, man y of th e co u n tries' strong nati on alistic pride dates back to th e
im pe rial age an d beyond; G rea t B rit ain , Spain, Germa ny. Fran ce, Italy, and o the r m embers
have had a taste of em p ire and d omin ati on , and th eir citize ns rem em ber th eir nati on's heyday . National id entity is an everyday ro adb lo ck t o an int egr ated fore ign policy, and thus
lim it s th e instituti on of a military fo rce.
T he U nite d Sta res is an important obstructio n to EU military power because th e EU
has lon g reli ed on th e U S fo r its sec urity need s th rou gh NATO , crea ti ng a " transatlantic
d ep enden ce. " 12 The Atla ntic alliance is an "ext ra insura nce poli cy" agains t aggressio n from
m ember states or o u tside powers like Russia.':' While th e co llapse of t he U SSR and th e end
of th e C old W ar " in th eory freed Europe from th e n eed for American lead ership, th e Balkan
w ars of the 19 90s revea led that E uropea ns still d ep ended on the U S to ke ep peace on th eir
own soil."!' Since U S fo rces m an aged m ost of th e major co nflicts th rou gh the 1990s, m an y
EU co unt ries lim ited th ei r own d efen se spending. In Koso vo in ea rly 200R, th e Uni ted
States, n ot th e E uropea n Uni o n , opposed Russian sup po rt for main ta ining Se rbia's co ntro l
and ensur ed th e protec tio n of K oso vo 's new sovereignty. EU m em ber states (wi th the excep tion of Spain) supp o rted K osov o through NATO , not throu gh any formal Europ ean
institutio n . The EU had no coll ecti ve military hard powe r with which it could interv ene,
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and could not even reach a co nse nsus o n wh at actio n should he taken , leaving the confli ct
largel y in another power's hands.
LIMITATIONS ON THE EU's ECONOMIC HARD POWER

The EU is the largest ec o no mic market in the world , with 458 million co nsume rs,
more than the US and Japan combined ." Its members "create about one qu arter of th e
world's gross nati onal produ ct and one fifth of the world' s commerce. "I" In additio n , the
co m bined GDP of its member states is alm ost $ 12 triJlion 17 and with the integration of th eir
curren cies, th ere is increasing demand for th e euro to tak e ov er as an alternative int ern ational reserve currency. IS The EU is now an econ omic giant, with the currency, the market,
and the eco no m ic power to prove it.
The EU is also qui ckl y becoming an ec on omic regulatory power becau se of its ability
to en courage other countries to adopt its standards and its talent for using glob alization for
its own ends. The EU can refuse acce ss to its m arket - a hu ge blow to any compauy - unl ess
a country adopts its produ ction standards; the organization has also subsidized the adoption
of th ose standards in dev eloping co unt ries, m aking it free o r at least affordable to comply
with the regulati ons." As th e number of countries involved in th e EU's regulated market
increases, it can exe rt gre ater pressure on th e nations th at have not complied. As a result
of EU-established standards, farm ers e ven outside of Europe are refusing to plant biot ech
crops like genetically engineered com , and American companies have sto pped using ethanol
in th eir skin care products." While these seem like in con sequential changes compared to
the extent of th e global market, the (l ct that the EU can influence American standards and
en courage farm ers to choose more expensive production options means th at the EU is successfully establishing itself as an economic "n orm setter. ""I
The EU can use the se resources as econ omic hard power. Preferential m arket access
has been used to gain regulatory co ncessio ns, but it also provides a powerful inc entive fo r
foreign states to support other EU goals. For example , the EU denied China access to its
armaments m ark et throu gh a trad e embargo after the Tiananmen massacre of 1989; the
embargo help ed influenc e C hi na's gradual improvements in protecting human rights until
the ban was Iified .:" However, th e EU has become incre asingl y un willing to use sanctio ns
to en act its poli cies. The sent im ent among Europeans is th at since "governments can evade
sanctions' effects [and] th e real victims are likel y to he innocent citizens of targeted nation s,,,", sancti on s sho uld not be used . The EU can also m anipulate developm ent assistan ce
to influence other countries, espe cially in th e developing world . It is the world's " largest
donor of 'development assistance,"?' granting $44 biJlion in 20 03, almost three times as
much as the US ."; By granting or withholding the se funds in respon se to an other nati on's
poli cies, the EU might wield greater influence; however , the EU doe s not use de velopment
assistance for th e sam e reasons it do es not impose sancti on s. The EU does not care to punish citiz ens for the actions of their government, and thu s does not employ these m eth ods.
Though the EU has grea t potential for using econo m ic hard power, it ch oo ses to rely on
others means of influence .
How DOES THE EU COMMAND WITH SOFT POWER?

The EU has become an expert at usin g soft power instead of hard power to achieve
its go als intemarionally. Soft power allows a nation to "obtain the outcomes it wants ...
becau se other countries w ant to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, [and]
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aspir ing to its level of prosperi ty and ope nness . "~b A nation's soft po wer relies o n its ability
to maint ain political policies that "shape th e pr efe ren ces of o tliers , " ~7 and 0 11 the in tern ation al reputation it ca n create. The E U is unique in its reliance 011 soft po we r rath e r than
hard powe r; trad itio nally, the great globa l powers have relied 011 hard po we r capabilities
like a large standing al1 ny to give th em legitimacy. The EU has no suc h capability . and yet
it con tin ues to ac t as a m ajor playe r. It represents a ne w kind of grea t power: o ne th at uses
econom ic ben efits and soft po w er po licies to work in its own natio nal int er est, gr;lrIt huma nitarian aid, and atte m pt to solve internatio nal co nflicts. The EU has fo ur chi ef m eans of
em ploy ing soft po wer: filling the power vacu urn left by mi strust of th e US, making its ideals
attrac tive to th e rest of th e world, mai nta ining its int ern ati onal repu tat ion , and capitalizin g
on th e appea l of e nlargeme nt.
According to J ohn M cC ol1n ick , th e E U " relies up on soft power to ex press itself and
to ac hieve its objectives , and . . .finds itself at a al
m or
adva ntage
in an inte rna tio na l enviro nm ent where violence as a mean
s of ac hievi ng inf uence is detested and rejec te d. ,,~s Alth ou gh
int ern ational violen ce has not gon e co m pletely o ut of style as M cC ol1nick suggests, th e
m odern political clima te is condu cive to th e EU's focus o n soft power if th e EU can prove
th at th is kind of influe nce is effective. T he wo rld's o nly rea l supe rpo wer, th e U S, has w orn
ou t mu ch of its welcome o n th e o ther side of th e wo rld ; th e U nited Sta tes' "war o n terro r"
is becomi ng increasin gly unpopul ar and the co untry is no w regarded as a " b ull in th e glo bal
chi na sho p . " 29 T his is a co nsequence of wielding hard power unilaterally and displaying
littl e reg ard for th e capabilities of ot her poorly armed na tio ns . Hard po wer and unilateralism
have lost th eir credi bility as th e only mean s of obtai ning po wer, and the EU capitalizes o n
th is disres pec t for pol itical tools associated with th e Uni te d States. Th e EU has also prove d
th at it is wi lling to flex its political m uscles in inte rna tio na l institutio ns, eve n w hen it mea ns
opposi ng th e United States. In 200 I, th e EU used its m ember states' 15 vo tes to rem o ve th e
U ni ted States from th e U nited N ation s C o mmissio n o n Human R ights, as protest against
th e U S' refusal to join the Int ern ation al Criminal Court and th e glo bal landmine ban, as
well as its cont inued use of th e death pe nalty. B y stand ing up to th e U nited States, th e EU
signa led that it can be po werful in its ow n rig ht, an d th at th e hard power tools used by th e
Un ited States are not th e o nly meth od to influence interna tio nal politics.
T he E U 's stand ards, ideals, and struc ture have becom e increasingly attractive to the
o utside world. N ot o nly has th e orga niza tio n ex te nded its eco no mic reach, but it has also
expa nde d the acceptan ce of its politi cal culture . As th e largest source of humanitari an aid ,
prov iding 47 percent of th e world to tal in 2001, th e EU " b uys good wi ll and thus augments
[its] soft po wer even in regio ns where it has n o obv io us o r dir ect geopolitical int er est, " 30
All o ver th e world, ot he r co un tries are ado pting E U standa rds and policy fram eworks, eve n
witho ut the EU provid ing eco no mic ince ntives . For exa m ple, th e E U 's poli cy o n personal
data privacy - strictly limi ting th e way th at stat es ca n use personal info n ua tio n - has been
adopted in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canad
a,
C hile, Japan, Peru , and Uruguay..ll Suc h
policy inheritan ces ca n enhance respec t for EU idea ls in thes e co unt ries, without th e EU
di rec tly int erven ing in th eir politics. Th e E U has engi nee red a un iqu e reputatio n as an economi c giant wit h a "business first" attitude and a w illingness to help developing co untries.
T his grant s th e orga n izatio n a moral high gr ound fro m whic h it can critiq ue th e Unit ed
States and pursue its o w n goal s, like fostering econ omic freedoms, protecting hum an rig hts,
and allo w in g thi rd world countri es to develop and j o in the int ernatio nal communiry.
T he E U' s reputation as a m ult ilateral organi zation is on e of its gre atest asset s, beca use
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it serves as a m odel for a new ty pe o f regi on al instituti on and can tail or its resp o nse to ev ery
internati onal political dilemma . The EU can "obtain th e outcomes it want s. . .becau se other
co u ntries wa n t to foll o w it, ad miri ng its values. em ulating its exa m ple, land] aspi ring to its
le vel o f prosper ity and ope n ness. " .11 The Asso ciati o n of So u t heast Asian N atio ns (ASEAN)
has an no u nced its int entions to form a " couunon m arket in go o ds, services, capital, and
lab or by 2020, " .1-' a mo ve inspired by Eu rop ean success . Othe r regio nal o rga nizatio ns like
th e African Unio n an d the So ut h Am erica n C o m m u nity of N at ion s also lo ok to th e EU for
guidan ce , and "a ffinities with th eir institu tional cultures... are potentially important avenu es
for Europea n influ ence in th ose regions ." :" In additi o n, th e EU ca n choose to be represented in ev ery pol itical conve rsatio n by th e me m be r state w ho se na tio nal id entiry o r polit ical
stru cture is m o re closely aligned with the nati on th e EU wants to influ en ce . Other co un tries
are m or e likely to come to th e d iplomatic table if th ey feel th at th e EU has an appreciation
for its ne ed s; in return , th e EU can w ield in flue nce in nl<ln y o the r parts of th e world .
In its im m ediate neighborhood. th e EU's 1I10st effective use of soft pow er is the influen ce it can exert b y th e suggestio n of enlarge ru ent." In order to rec ei ve the ben efits of EU
m em bersh ip , potent ial members ado pt EU sta nda rds, cha nge th eir gove rn me ntal struct ures,
and adj ust th eir foreign and domestic pol icies to align more carefully wi th th e EU . Th e two
most recent additions to the EU , Roman ia and Bul garia, m ade hu ge co ncessio ns to j oin ;
th e EU made th e " provision o f eco no mic aid partl y d ep en d e nt o n progress in area s such
as jud icial and adm inistra tive reform ":" in both co u nt ries, enco ur aging them to ado p t fair
pr act ice law s and restru cture th ei r co urt system s. T hey resp o nded to th ese pressures and a
num ber of o the r co nd itio ns, and success fully j oined th e E U in January o f 20 07 . Another
exam ple of th e soft po wer influ ence that e nlarge men t can have is th e effec t th e EU has had
on Turkey. Although Turkey enjoys a trad e agr eem en t that gra n ts it m ost of th e co m mercial
pr ivileges o f E U membership , th e co un try still see ks to j oin the E U. In respo nse to consideratio n of its m embership , Turkey has made impro vements in human rig hts, reformed its
law s o n the free do m o f ex pressio n, limited the rol e of the an n y in its national po litics, and
imp ro ved its elec to ral processes." T he co u ntry had " d rastically revised laws an d po licies on
such sensitive issues as th e de ath pe nalty , th e tre atm ent of et hnic mino riti es, and th e ro le of
th e m ilitary' ? " even before th e E U had agreed to disc uss its membership; th e elusive ide a
of EU membership w as eno ugh to spur hu ge ch an ges in Turkey's gov ernment witho u t any
fo rma l ne got iations w ith the EU . T he sugges tio n of e nla rge me nt, inclusion , and int egration
is a powerful to ol; oth er countries want th e suc cess and influ ence th at the E U has crea ted
for itself, and th e m ost dir ect m ean s of o btain ing it is to join th e EU.
IRAN: A CASE STUDY OF EUROPEAN SOFT POWER

In Iran , th e EU has taken th e lead in negotiati ons regarding the cessatio n of th e nucl ear
pr o gram, The dipl omat ic ne goti ati on s, beginning in early 2003, hop ed to avoi d an oth er
m ilitary con frontation in th e M iddle East, pr e vent Iran fro m o btai ning military nu clear
cap abilities, and protect the Nucl ear Proliferation Treaty. " By combi ning th e EU-3 (G rea t
Brit ain , G ermany. and Fran ce) along wi t h th e U nit ed Stat es, Ru ssia, and China (altoge the r
th e EU- 3 + 3) and work ing in co nj unct io n w ith UN Sec uri ty Co unci l in vol vem ent , th e
EU hoped to attain consensus amo ng th e major po we rs an d project a united policy against
Irani an nucl ear proliferati on. In Octo be r of 2003 , the EU-3 + 3 signe d th e nego tiations'
first agreemen t: in return for Europ ean reco gnition o f 1r.1I1 's right to light wa te r reacto rs
for m anufa cturing en ergy as w ell as other trad e programs , the Ira n ian government agree d
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to suspend nucl ear acti vities and allow Internati on al Atomic En ergy Agen cy ([AE A) in specto rs int o the country. 40 Despite early successes, th e negotiation s broke down in 2006;
Iran resumed th e produ cti on of enri ch ed uranium in April of th at year and ann ounced its
int enti on to install 3,000 ce ntrifuges - e no ug h to mo ve forward w ith a nucl ear pr ogram ."
The EU -3+ 3 has since struggled w ith Iran 's rejection o fI AEA/ U N inspectors in early 200 7
and threats to the exist en ce of Israel, amo ng a ho st of smaller co nflicts and pr obl ems. " T o
date, no satisfactory agreement has been reached, th ou gh the neg oti ations are co nti nuing. It
seem s unlik ely that the EU-J +J will be able to obtain an agreem ent acceptable to all parties,
since both sides hold powerful GIrds and escalation m ay be immi ne nt.' :' In tenus of limiting
nuclear proliferation , th e negotiati on s have been a failure.
But reaching an una ssailable agreement was not necessarily th e EU 's onl y goa l in Iran .
If one of th e EU 's obje ctiv es was to offer itself as a part of the negoti ations and promote the
o rganizatio n as a reasonable alte rnative to the United States, it has projected th at image successfully." Finding a reason able soluti on to Iranian nuclear demands is de sirable , but the EU
also has m or e pragmati c go als: in creasing the po w er of its own reputation and the prestige
of its international poli cies.' ; By leadin g the Iranian negotiations, the EU bolst ers its reputation, on e of its most influ ential soft power advantages, and carves o ut an important place for
itself in th e mo st pre ssing co nflicts o f inte rn atio nal sec ur ity and defense . Even though th e
EU has not been wh olly successful in co m pleting its stated obj ecti ves, it will benefit from
representing both th e EU and the W estern world o n the int ern ational stage.
THE SOFT POWER DILEMMA: CAN IT WORK?

The sour ces of Europ ean power have been identified , but it remains to be seen whether its relian ce on soft po wer is a formula for lastin g internati on al influe nce . A number o f
problems remain for the EU regarding the effectiv eness of its power and th e limits of its
diplomati c tools, and th e E U 's international power is still being defined. Iran is an exampl e
o f the limit s of Europ ean power on th e global stage; the nucl ear co nflict is one of the most
dangerou s situatio ns that the wo rld faces, and th e EU has shown that it canno t handle it
with soft power alon e. Its participation in the negoti ations has co nt ributed to its gro wing
reputation, but the EU was not able to solve the co nflict or suc ceed where th e United Stat es
has not.
The problem of sec urity has th e potential to derail the E U 's reliance o n soft power.
The Europ ean Uni on's relatio nshi p w ith the Un ited States is espec ially troubling, because
the EU needs the US to provide its basic military legitimacy. The E U will co ntinue to rely
on the US o r another great power with military presence as lon g as it is without an arulY of
its own, whi ch gives it mu ch less leverag e internationall y. The EU is associated with American milita ry o pe ratio ns in m an y co untries by its o w n accord or throu gh NATO, and if th ese
operati on s go aw ry, th e EU is also respon sible . Even w hen the EU is not in agre em ent with
the United States' military policies, they have few means of o pposing th ese decisions. As
member states' defense budgets continu e to declin e," it is qu estionable that they will be able
to pr otect th emselves as needed.
But for no w, th e EU o ccupies th e perfect p osition ; its sec urity need s are pro vided for
with very little effort, and its poli cies have aligned closel y with the United States. In situations wh ere EU and US policies have differed, th e EU has not been co m pletely tied to
American decisions. In Iraq, many EU countries refused to pr ovide tro op s o r have since
recalled th em in the face of what man y European s see as Am eri can hlilur e. As a result , th e
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U S has been forced to act unil aterally , wh ich und ermines the internati onal conununiry's
go odwiJJ. Thi s vacuum is a p otential space for the EU to fill, sin ce it does not h ave the
military capabiliti es to act on its own lik e th e United Stat es and is an in stitution found ed Oil
mulrilareralisni . In fact, non-integration has its benefits. The diffi culties of integrati on assur e
o the r nations th at they ne ed not fear a militant or ag gres sive EU , makin g them m ore likel y
to invest in th e European market and C0111e to the dipl omatic tabl e. The EU wields 27 votes
in international institutions instead of only o ne , maintain s a reputation of unaffected comm erce and multilareralism, and represents th e "good cop " abroad, a perfect situati on for an
o rganizatio n with the EU 's goals.:" Man y countries are att racted to th e idea of a co alitio n
of cooperati ve states, especially o ne th at has pro ved to be so economically su cce ssful . The
ex iste nce of the union implies that it ca n manage dipl omatic conflicts, balance differences
in foreign polic y, and allow for national identities and biases, whi ch are all important for
resol ving an y int e rn atio nal co nflic t. The m aintenance of m ember sta te so ve reignty is actu<Ill y a boon , becau se it reminds other countries that th e EU is f.lI11ili ar w ith cooperating and
balancing national interests. Though so ft power dearl y has its limits - <IS sugge sted by the
ne gotiations with Iran - the EU still has sig nifican t influence in international afEtirs.
END NOTES

I . David P. Ca lleo, "Unipol ar Illu sions," S urvival: Global Politics and Stmtl;lZ
)', Volum e 49,
Issue 3, (2007,) 73.
2.

Rockwell A. Schnabel, TI/(' Next Superpower], (Lanham, MD: R owman and Littl efield

3.

Joseph N ye, The Parado»

4.

Trevor Salmon, "The European Uni on .just an Alli an ce or a Military Alliance>," The

5.

Barry R . Posen, "European Union Se curity and Defense Poli cy : Response to Unipo-

Publishers In c., 20( 5) , 27 .

4 A l1Icri
ft1

11

Power, (New York : Oxford University Press, 2(02) ,

8.

JOll fllal 4 Stmll:iZ.i
c
Studies, Volume 29, Issue 5, (October 200(»,825 .
lar it y?;" Security Sllfdies.Volull1e 15, Issue 2, Ouly 2006), 151 .
6.

Ibid, 151-3 .

7.

Salmon , 838 .

8.

Ihid , 835-(J.

9.

Ibid,838.

10. David Andrews, (Professor of Internati onal R elati ons at Scripps C o llege), in di scussion
with the author, M ay 20 08 .
11 . C}. Chivers and Ni ch ola s Kulish, " Kosovo is Re co gni zed hut R ebuked hy O the rs,"

Th e New York Times, (2/19 /08) . 2 .
12 . James Sh eehan, "Why th e European Union will not becom e a Superpower," speech,
M arian Miner Cook Athenaeum , 2/11 / 08 .
13 . Schnahel, 75 .
14. Ibid,64 .

] 5. Schnabel, 27.
16 . James Sh eehan, Where have all the Soldiers?,GOIle

(New York : H oughton M ifflin , 2( 08 ),

The Soft Power Dilemma

'38

HelEN POLLOCK

Claremont M cKenna College

2 1H.
17. Schna bel, 27 .
18. Ibid . 28 .
1l). Schna be l.Y'.
20. Ihid , 37- H.
2 1. And rews .
22 . Schnabel. 56 .
23. Ihid .
24. Ibid , 59 .
25. Ibid ,5l)-60.
26 . Ibid .
27 . Ibid .
28 . M c'Corruick . fi .
29. R eid , 15.
30. Sch nahel, 58.
31. Ibid, 58-59.
32. N ye, 8.
33 . Schnahel,62.
34 . Ibid.
35 . Andrew s.
36. Shepherd , l 18 .
37. Schnabel, 61.
38. Ibid.
3<). j oschka Fischer, "Iran: Hi gh Stakes," DisSCIII
, Volum e 54, Issue 1, (Winter 2007 ), 3l.l-41 .
40 . Mark Leon ard . " C an EU dipl omacy sto p Iran 's nuclear programme >,' C entre for Euro pean Reform ,Worki ng Paper Seri es, (Nov em ber 20 05), 7 .
41 . Bruno Dupre, "Iran Nuclear Crisis.The Ri ght Approach," Prolijeration Analvsis, Ca rn egie Endowment for International Peace, (February 2007),44.
42. Ihid.4 3.
43. Ihid , 46.
44 . Andrew s.
45. Ibid.
4(J. She eha n , Where liavc all the Soldiers Cone], 21 H.
47. Andrews.

https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/11

